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Abstract 
The judiciary, as the guardian of constitutionalism, ensures that the organs of government do not stray into the 
sphere of each other, and that powers and authority are exercised within prescribed constitutional boundaries.  
Accordingly, the judiciary acts as a watchdog over the other organs of government and ensures their fidelity to 
the doctrine of separation of powers and respect for the supremacy of the Constitution.  This Article assesses the 
exercise of the power of judicial review of executive and legislative actions by the Nigerian courts.   Lessons are 
also drawn from other jurisdictions, such as the United States of America, Ghana and South Africa.  While the 
performance of the judiciary in Nigeria has so far been commendable, several factors continue to impede its 
attainment of optimal performance.  These include lack of judicial independence, impact of corruption and 
judicial philosophy of supporting the executive, amongst others.    These problems must be addressed through 
proper selection and appointment of people of integrity as judicial officers, training and re-training of judicial 
officers, improved conditions of service and effective control of the performance of judicial officers, amongst 
others; in order to enhance the utilisation of the power of judicial review in the promotion of constitutionalism in 
Nigeria. 
 
1. Introduction 
 The Constitution of Nigeria and those of most other African countries contain impressive mechanisms 
for checking and restraining the exercise of executive and legislative powers.  However, Oyewo1 has rightly 
observed that constitutional provisions that foster constitutionalism and rule of law are not being effectively 
enforced in Nigeria, and there is the need for the various arms of government, especially the legislature and the 
judiciary to be alive to their constitutional duties.2  Nwabueze3 draws a distinction between “formal” and “real” 
constitutional democracy and notes that lamentably in Nigeria, the constitutional democracy transmitted in May, 
1999 is one that exists largely on the pages of the Constitution.   
Arguing in the same vein, Oketh-Ogendo4 coined the phrase “Constitutions without constitutionalism” 
in apparent reference to the African paradox of having lofty constitutional provisions that support 
constitutionalism and the rule of law but actively working against their actualisation.  Mangu5 argues that 
“Constitution” should be distinguished from “constitutionalism” as the former refers to the form, to the 
document itself, while the latter relates to the substance, to the values embedded in the constitutional provisions.  
The existence of a Constitution even with clear provisions on separation of powers, limitations on governmental 
powers, human rights and other democratic principles would not necessarily guarantee constitutionalism. 
 Constitutionalism is basically concerned with the implementation, observance and enforcement of 
constitutional limitations and values.  It should be viewed as a method of limiting political abuse and ensuring 
that the powers of the State are constrained so that the State cannot act capriciously.6  Ronsenfeld7 maintains that 
                                                          
1
  O. Oyewo, “Constitutions, Good Governance and Corruption: Challenges and Prospects for Nigeria”, available at 
www.enclsyn.gr/peper/.../paper%20by%200oyelowo%20oyewo.pdf. (accessed 15/5/2014). 
2
    Ibid., at 20. 
3
   B.O. Nwabueze, How President Obasanjo Subverted Nigeria’s Federal System (Ibadan: Gold Press Ltd., 2007) p. xxv. 
4
   H.W. Okoth-Ogendo, “Constitutions Without Constitutionalism: Reflections on an African Political Paradox”, in Douglas 
Greenberg et al. eds., Constitutionalism and Democracy Transitions in the Contemporary World 65 – 80 (1993).  See 
also R. Coomarasuamy, “Uses and Usurpation of Constitutional Ideology”, in Douglas Greenberg et al eds, Ibid. at 160 
(noting that Constitutions in South Asia are formal pieces of paper, whose basic provisions, such as fundamental rights, 
are rarely observed).   
5
    A.M. Mangu, “Constitutional Democracy and Constitutionalism in Africa” (2006) 3 Conflict Trends 3 – 8. 
6
    L.E. Habasonda, “Presidentialism and Constitutionalism in Africa: “Third Term” Phenomenon/Extension of Tenure: the 
Zambian Experience”, available at 
http://www.Zesn.org.zw/does/Presidentialism%20and%20Constitutionalism%20in%20/lee%20Habas/onda.ppt.  
(accessed 15/5/2014). 
7
    M. Rosenfeld, “Modern Constitutionalism as Interplay between Identity and Diversity” in M. Rosenfeld ed. 
Constitutionalism, Identity, Difference, and Legitimacy.  Theoretical Perspectives (Durham and London: Duke 
University Press1994). 
Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-3240 (Paper)  ISSN 2224-3259 (Online) 
Vol.40, 2015 
 
193 
constitutionalism is a “three-faceted concept” as it requires imposing limits on governmental powers, adherence 
to the rule of law and protection of human rights.  Constitutionalism is the antithesis of arbitrary rule. 
 An important bulwark of constitutionalism is the existence of an efficient and effective mechanism 
controlling and compelling compliance with the letter and spirit of the Constitution.1   Indeed, there can be 
no constitutionalism in terms of respect for the Constitution and the values and principles that underlie it if there 
are no secure review mechanisms, whether by ordinary courts or other specialised courts or bodies, that can 
independently enforce the provisions of the Constitution, while checking and controlling any abuses of its 
provisions.2  The responsibility of ensuring that the standards and procedures laid down in a Constitution are 
observed rests with the courts.3 
In the light of the foregoing, this article focuses on how the power of judicial review, vested in the 
courts, could be effectively exercised to check and restraint arbitrary exercise of legislative and executive powers 
in the promotion of constitutionalism in Nigeria.  It is important to stress that both legislative and executive 
powers are generally susceptible to abuse and must therefore be checked and restrained in order to forestall 
arbitrariness and promote constitutionalism.   
 
2. The Concept of Judicial Review   
 
Judicial review is the power of the court, in appropriate proceedings before it, to declare a legislative or 
executive act either contrary to, or in accordance with, the Constitution, with the effect of rendering the act 
invalid or vindicating its validity and so putting it beyond challenge in future.4     In the case of Abdulkarim v 
Incar Nig, Ltd.,5 the Supreme Court of Nigeria, per Nnaemeka Agu JSC, succinctly highlighted the scope of 
judicial review within the Nigerian constitutional jurisprudence as follows: 
 
In Nigeria, which has a written presidential constitution, judicial review entails three 
different processes; namely: 
 
(i) The courts particularly the Supreme Court, ensuring that every arm of government 
plays its role in the true spirit of the principles of separation of powers as 
provided for in the Constitution. 
 
(ii) That every public functionary performs his functions according to law, including the 
Constitution; and  
 
(iii) For the Supreme Court, that it reviews court decisions including its own, when the 
need arises in order to ensure that the country does not suffer under the same 
regime of obsolete or wrong decisions.   
 
Primarily, this article focuses on items (i) and (ii) above, which deal with the court’s   power to review 
both executive and legislative actions based on the grounds of unconstitutionality and illegality.   
 It is significant to note, from the outset, that in Nigeria the power of judicial review is expressly 
conferred on the courts by the Constitution,6 unlike in the United States of America where such power had to be 
assumed by the Supreme Court itself in the locus classicus case of Marbury v Madison.7  In that case the 
Supreme Court of the United States, for the first time, struck down an Act of Congress as unconstitutional.  This 
                                                          
1
   Chales Manga Fombad, “Challenges to Constitutionalism and Constitutional Rights in Africa and the Enabling Role of 
Political Parties: Lessons and Perspectives from Southern Africa”. 
www.saifac.org/docs/repapers/RPS%20NO%2018paf. Accessed 10/7/2014.  
2
    Ibid. 
3
   I.T. Mohammad, “Judicialism and Electoral Processes in Nigeria: What the Supreme Court Did; What the Supreme Court 
May Do”, being a paper presented at the 2012 Felix Okoye Memorial Lecture, Organised by Nigerian Institute of 
Advanced Legal Studies, University of Lagos, held at the Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, University of 
Lagos, on 18th September 2012.   
4
     B.O. Nwabueze, The Presidential Constitution of Nigeria (London: C.Hurst & Company (Publishers) Ltd in Association 
with Nwamife Publishers Ltd., 1982) p. 309.   
5
   (1992) 7 NWLR (Pt. 251) 1. 
6
   1999 Nig. Const., s. 4(8); s. 6(6)(a). 
7
   5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).  See generally, K.M. Stack, “The Reviewability of the President’s Statutory Powers” (2009) 
62 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 1172.  For a critique of the case of Marbury v Madison, see Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 
(1963) 2 - 13. 
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decision created the doctrine of judicial review and set up the Supreme Court of the United States as Chief 
interpreter and enforcer of the Constitution. 
By giving the power of judicial review to the courts, the Nigerian Constitution ensures obedience to its 
provisions by all persons and authorities since any violation of its provisions will be an illegality.1  Furthermore, 
the Constitution’s supremacy is assured since any derogation from it will be declared void because it is 
unconstitutional.2   
The vesting of executive powers of the federation in the President and the exercise of such powers by 
him are made subject to the provisions of the Constitution.3  The executive powers so vested in the President 
extend to the execution and maintenance of the Constitution itself and all laws made by the National Assembly.  
Thus, the President shall ensure by his actions that the provisions of the Constitution are observed and enforced.   
Furthermore, the President, subject to the provisions of the Constitution, may exercise the executive powers by 
himself either directly or through the Vice President and Ministers of the government of the Federation or 
officers of the public service of the Federation.4  It therefore follows that executive acts or omissions could relate 
not only to the direct acts or omissions of the President but also to the acts or omissions of the entire executive 
arm of the federal government including institutions constituting the public service of Nigeria. 
The provision of section 1(2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 stresses the 
supremacy of the Constitution and insists that Nigeria can only be governed in accordance with the provisions of 
the Constitution.  By means of judicial review, the judicial organ of government exercises a measure of control 
and check over the legislature and the executive.5  To support this controlling and checking functions of the 
judiciary, the Constitution provides that the constitutional powers of the National Assembly or of a State House 
of Assembly shall be subject to the jurisdiction of courts and of tribunals established by law; and accordingly the 
legislative Assemblies shall not enact any law that ousts or purports to oust the jurisdiction of a court of law or of 
a judicial tribunal established by law.6 
 
3. The Power of Judicial Review and the Nigerian Courts: An Overview 
 
The Nigerian courts, even under military dictatorship, have been able to preserve constitutionalism to 
an extent7 and have not suffered the same fate of disbandment that befell the legislature during the military 
regimes.8  Since transition to civil rule in 1999, however, the courts have played a much more pronounced and 
critical role in settling varieties of disputes and becoming a bulwark for constitutional democracy and guarantee 
of fundamental rights – what Nigerians labeled as the “last hope of the common man”.9   
The courts in Nigeria, particularly the Supreme Court, have risen to the occasion by saving the 
country’s bourgeoning democracy from total collapse.  This is evident from several decisions of the courts 
reviewing legislative and executive actions that are contrary to the provisions of the Constitution.  The courts 
have made radical pronouncements in landmark cases on some constitutional issues, such as conduct of election, 
impeachment procedures, revenue allocation, division of powers, fundamental rights, political parties and local 
government, which have gone a long way in strengthening democracy10  and fostering constitutionalism in 
Nigeria.  Some of these landmark cases shall be examined under the following headings: 
 
3.1 Creation of New Local Government Areas by the States 
 
 In the case of Attorney General, Lagos State v Attorney General of the Federation,11 the Supreme Court 
of Nigeria declared the Local Government Area Law N0. 5 of 2002 under which 57 local governments were 
                                                          
1
   S.I. Nchi, Separation of powers under the Nigeria Constitution (Jos: Greenworld Publishing Co. Ltd., 2000) p. 148. 
2
   1999 Nig. Const., ss. 1, 4(8) and 6(6). 
3
   The 1992 Constitution of Ghana contains a similar but more explicit provision in Art. 58(1) which states that the executive 
authority of Ghana shall vest in the President and shall be exercised in accordance with the provisions of the 
Constitution. 
4
  1999 Nig. Const., s. 5(1)(a). 
5
  Nchi, Op. Cit. at 148. 
6
  Ibid. See 1999 Nig. Const., s. 4(8). 
7
  Lakammi and Others v A.G. Western State (1971) U.I.L.R. 201 S.C. 
8
 The courts were preserved by “the win some, loose some, cat and mouse relationship” with the military in their adjudicatory 
roles. 
9
   T. Mamman and P. C. Okorie, “Nurturing Constitutionalism through the Courts: Constitutional Adjudication and 
Democracy in Nigeria”, available at http://www.ialsnet.org/meetings/constit/.../mamman & Okorie (Nig). pdf., accessed 
22/5/2014. 
10
   J. Amupitan, “The Role of the Courts in Strengthening Democracy at the Local Government Level in Nigeria,” available 
at http://www.ialsnet.org/meetings/constit/.../Amupitanjoash (Nigeria).pdf., accessed 22/5/2014.  
11
   (2004) 18 NWLR (Pt. 904) 1. 
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created by the Lagos State government as unconstitutional, null and void.  Under the said law, the existing 20 
Local Government areas recognised under the 1999 Nigerian Constitution were broken into 57 Local 
Government Councils.  The Law in effect abolished Local Government Areas created under the 1999 
Constitution by altering their names, adjusting their boundaries and dividing them into smaller units.  The Law 
further vested the Governor with powers to appoint persons to administer the affairs of the newly created local 
government areas.   In the same case, the Supreme Court of Nigeria also held as null and void the decision of the 
Federal Government to withhold statutory financial allocations due and payable to the Lagos State Government 
in respect of the 20 existing Local Governments.  Surprisingly, even after the Supreme Court’s decision, the 
Federal Government still refused to release the funds to the said 20 Local Governments.  Therefore, for about 3 
years there was no statutory allocation to the Local Governments in Lagos State. 
 The Supreme Court also pointed out in that case that the creation of additional Local Government areas 
in Nigeria would result in the amendment of the Constitution.  Thus, no State Government could, on its own, 
create additional Local Government areas without involving the National Assembly, which would then set the 
necessary machinery in motion for the amendment of section 3(6) of the 1999 Constitution to accommodate the 
newly created local government areas. 
 
3.2 Dissolution of Local Government Councils 
 
 The Court of Appeal in the cases of Attorney General, Plateau State v Goyol and Ors,1 and Attorney 
General, Benue State v Umar and Ors,2 declared the actions of the Plateau State Governor and that of the Benue 
State Governor, respectively, in dissolving the Local Government Councils in those States as unconstitutional, 
null and void.3  The Laws made by the two State Houses of Assembly which authorised the Governors to impede 
the smooth running of the Local Government Councils were also declared to be unconstitutional, null and void.  
The actions of the two State governments led to serious tension between the state governments and the elected 
council chairmen and councilors who formed themselves into associations to resist the dissolution.4 
 
3.3 Nomination and Substitution of Candidates for Election 
 
 In Nigeria, State and Federal elections are conducted by the Independent National Electoral 
Commission (INEC) which receives nomination from political parties.  The nomination process is the sole 
responsibility of the respective political parties for which the court cannot interfere.5   However, where a 
candidate is properly nominated by the party and the nominee presented within time to the INEC, any 
subsequent changes would have to be made in accordance with the law.6  An illegal change or substitution is 
fatal to both the political party and the candidate.  In the case of Ugwu v Ararume,7 the Supreme Court of Nigeria 
laid down the legal framework for change or substitution of candidates based on its ingenuous interpretation of 
the Electoral Act, 2006 as follows: 
 
From the words used by the Legislature in section 34(1) and (2) of the Electoral Act, 2006, it is 
clear that the intention of the Legislature is that even though the right of choice of a candidate 
to be sponsored for any election remains the special preserve of the political parties, just as the 
right to change or substitute such candidates, the right is no longer to be exercised 
capriciously, or any how or without recourse to reasonable expectations of a decent society.  
The law expressly states that the substitution must be made within 60 days to the election and 
there must be cogent and verifiable reasons for the substitution given by the political party 
                                                          
1
   (2007) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1059) 57. 
2
   (2008) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1068) 311. 
3
  See also Governor of Akwa Ibom State & Ors v Hon. Peter Umah (unreported) Suit N0. CA/C/30/2001, quoted in E. Okon, 
Local Government Administration in Nigeria 2003) pp. 193 – 218 where the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the 
High Court declaring the dissolution of Ini Local Government Council of Akwa Ibom State by the Governor as illegal.  
However, the Court of Appeal further held that though the word “dissolution” is missing in the provisions of section 7(1) 
of the 1999 Constitution, the House of Assembly which has the powers to make laws to regulate the affairs of a Local 
Government Council, that is, for establishment, structure, composition etc, of such council, can make a law for 
dissolution of an erring local government council and for a bye election.  If not there will be chaos and disorder.   
4
   Amupitan, Op. Cit.  
5
   Onuoha v Okafor (1983) 2 SCNLR 244, Dalhatu v Turaki (2003) 15 NWLR (Pt. 843) 310; Ehinlanwo v Oke (2008) All 
FWLR 1007.      
6
   Electoral Act, 2006, s. 34(1) and (2) required that the substitution be made within 60 days to the election and that cogent 
and verifiable reasons for the substitution be given by the political party desiring the change or substitution. 
7
   (2007) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1048) 367. 
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desiring the change or substitution.  The Legislature intended to bring sanity into the exercise 
by the political parties of their right to change or substitute their candidates, even on the eve or 
after an election simply because the nomination or sponsorship of a candidate for an election is 
the prerogative of the political parties to which the courts will not interfere or have no 
jurisdiction to interfere. 
 
The principle in the above case was followed by the Supreme Court of Nigeria in the case of Amaechi v 
INEC,1 where the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) had replaced Amaechi with Omehia as its candidate for the 
Governorship election in Rivers State.  In an action challenging the substitution, the appellant (Amaechi) 
contended that there were no cogent and verifiable reasons for the substitution as required by law.  In his 
response, the 2nd respondent (Omehia) challenged the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the matter, contending 
that the issue of selection of a party’s candidate for an election, being an internal affair of the party, was non-
justiciable. The two lower courts upheld the respondent’s objection.  However, in allowing Amaechi’s appeal, 
the Supreme Court of Nigeria held as follows: 
 
In the said Ararume Case this court decided that to offer the reason framed as “error” for a 
change of candidate is not in compliance with section 34(2) of the Electoral Act 2006.  In this 
case, the same reason relied upon by the 3rd respondent in substituting the appellant with the 
2nd respondent is the word “error”, without more.  Clearly in my view the cases are similar and 
the same principle applies….  It is my finding that the appellant was not substituted according 
to the law and therefore remained the 3rd respondent’s nominated candidate for the Rivers State 
Governorship election held on 14/4/07…. It was the appellant and not the 2nd respondent who 
must be deemed to have won the elections.2 
 
 Accordingly, the Supreme Court directed that Amaechi be sworn in immediately as the Governor of 
Rivers State.  Though the practical effect of this decision was to declare a person who did not actually participate 
in an election as the winner of that election,3 we believe that the Supreme Court, in its pursuit of justice, took the 
right decision based on the facts and circumstances of this case.   The decision introduced a significant check on 
the power of political parties to nominate and field candidates for elections which hitherto was totally regarded 
as a political matter within the exclusive domain of the political parties to which courts lack the jurisdiction to 
entertain.  However, under the Electoral Act, 2010,4 political parties are no longer permitted to change or 
substitute their candidates whose names had already been submitted to the INEC, except in the case of death or 
withdrawal by the candidates. 
 
3.4 Disqualification of Candidates by the INEC 
 
 The decision of the INEC to exclude certain candidates, who were validly nominated by their political 
parties, from contesting elections was also challenged in courts.  The INEC had based its decision to exclude 
some nominated candidates on their purported indictment by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 
(EFCC) investigation and the Government White Paper on it.5  Thus, in Action Congress of Nigeria & Anor v 
INEC,6 the Supreme Court of Nigeria held that the Independent National Electoral Commission had no power to 
exclude any candidate from contesting an election.   The facts of the case are that the plaintiffs instituted an 
action against the INEC, being the defendant at the Federal High Court for determination of whether the 
defendant has the power to disqualify any candidate properly sponsored by a political party without recourse to a 
court of law.  At the conclusion of hearing, the trial court granted the plaintiffs’/appellants’ claim in part.  It held 
that although the defendant/respondent had the power to screen candidates for election, it did not have the power 
to disqualify a candidate.  It also held that the power to disqualify any candidate sponsored by any political party 
                                                          
1
   (2007) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1065) 105, cited and followed in Ehinlanwo v Oke (2008) All FWLR 1007.    
2
   Amaechi v Omehia, Ibid. at 105 – 106, per Katsina – Alu.  The submission of the Respondent that section 308 dealing with 
immunity of the Governor from judicial process enured to the benefit of 2nd respondent – Omehia, was rejected by the 
Court as untenable, since the wrong upon which the appellant premised his claim, had been in existence before the 
election. 
3
 See The Daily Sun Newspaper, Monday, October 29, 2007 p. 6, where Chief Gani Fawehinmi (SAN) condemned the order 
of the Supreme Court which directed that Amaechi be sworn in as Governor of Rivers State when he did not contest the 
election; describing it as a “terrible judicial imposition”.  
4
  Electoral Act, 2010, s. 33. (Nigeria) 
5
 A.A. Bello, “Judicial Review As Efficient Tool For Electoral Reform in Nigeria,” available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstractz1119526. (accessed 22/5/2014) 
6
  (2007) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1048) 220. 
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including the 2nd plaintiff/appellant from contesting an election is vested in the courts as provided in section 
32(5) of the Electoral Act, 2006. 
 The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, held that to disqualify a person from contesting election 
for the office of the President solely on the basis of an indictment for embezzlement or fraud made against him 
by an administrative Panel of Inquiry with the presumption of guilt for those offences thereby implied, runs 
completely against the purpose and significance of vesting of judicial power in the courts by section 6(1) of the 
1999 Constitution.  The Supreme Court pointed out that there was nothing within the provision of section 137(1) 
of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 that empowers the INEC to disqualify any 
candidate, especially the 2nd appellant, from contesting the election as a presidential candidate.  According to 
their Lordships, “there is nowhere in the Constitution where any such power is conferred on INEC to disqualify 
any candidate.  By virtue of section 6(1) and (6) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, it 
is only a court of law that can exercise a function, which is exclusively adjudicative in nature”.  The Court 
pronounced with finality that the INEC, not being a court of law cannot exercise such adjudicative function.  It 
relied on section 32(4) of the Electoral Act, 2006, which provides that: 
Any person who has reasonable grounds to believe that any information given by a 
candidate in the affidavit is false, may file a suit at the High Court of a State or Federal 
High Court against such person seeking a declaration that the information contained in the 
affidavit is false. 
If the court determines that any of the information contained in the affidavit is false, the 
court shall issue an order disqualifying the candidate from contesting the election.1 
 
The apex court further stated as follows:  
 
Whereas under section 21(8) and (9) of the Electoral Act, 2002 the Independent National 
Electoral Commission (INEC) had the power to disqualify candidates, the legal position 
changed with the enactment of the Electoral Act, 2006.  The lawmakers in their wisdom 
took away the power from the respondent.  The power is now vested in the courts by 
virtue of section 32(4), (5) and (6) of the Electoral Act, 2006.2 
 
 Mere allegation of crime or dishonest conduct, without evidence of trial and conviction, is not enough 
to ground the disqualification of a person from contesting a primary election of a political party or any other 
election.3 
 In compliance with the Supreme Court’s decision in this case, the presidential candidate of the Action 
Congress, Alhaji Atiku Abubakar, was eventually placed on the ballot and allowed to contest the elections.  
Following on the heels of the Supreme Court’s decision in the AC Case, the Governorship elections of Kogi and 
Adamawa States were annulled by the Governorship and Legislative Election Petition Tribunals of the respective 
States and the nullification upheld on appeal by the appropriate Court of Appeal sitting as appellate court on 
election petitions.  Elections conducted in both States were nullified on grounds of unlawful exclusion of 
candidates of some political parties (Action Congress Party candidate in Adamawa and All Nigeria Peoples Party 
candidate in Kogi).  In the repeat elections directed by the Court of Appeal, only the candidates excluded were to 
be on the ballot without recourse to any intra party nomination process.  The other political parties were free to 
nominate any candidate they desired. 
 
3.5 Removal from Office for Changing Political Party 
 
 Alhiji Atiku Abubakar, while serving as Nigeria’s Vice President, successfully challenged an attempt 
by the President, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, to remove him from office after he relinquished his membership of 
the People Democracy Party (PDP), on whose platform he was elected along with the President, to join another 
party, the Action Congress (AC).  On the 22nd December 2006, the office of the Vice President was declared 
vacant by the presidency.  This followed his expulsion from his former political party, the People’s Democratic 
Party (PDP); subsequent upon which he decamped to the Action Congress.  The presidency insisted that it relied 
on the provisions of sections 142 to 146 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria to arrive at its decision.  In Attorney 
General of the Federation v Atiku Abubakar,4 the Supreme Court said that disagreements between the President 
and the Vice President cannot avail the President a legal justification for depriving the Vice President of any 
                                                          
1
  Electoral Act 2006, s. 32(4)(5). 
2
  Ibid. Per Katsina-Alu JSC at 262. 
3
  Mohammad, Op. Cit.    
4
  (2007) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1031) 626; (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 456) 1. 
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powers, including the right to exhaust his or her tenure as Vice President as conferred by the 1999 Constitution 
of Nigeria.  Upon a proper construction of the provisions of section 146 of the 1999 Constitution, the Supreme 
Court dismissed the appeal and held that: “The term of the 1st respondent as Vice President has not expired and 
he cannot be removed by the President, except through impeachment by the National Assembly”.1 
 
3.6 Immunity of Public Officers from Prosecution  
 
 One of the most criticised provisions of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria is section 308 which provides 
for immunity of the President, Vice-President, Governor and Deputy-Governor from judicial processes.2  This 
insulation of the leadership of the executive from judicial process is generally believed to encourage executive 
lawlessness, engender abuse of power and shield corrupt practices by such leaders.3  Initially, the provision was 
understood and applied by the Federal High Court in Fawehinmi v Inspector-General of Police4 as a bar to 
investigation of such officers.  On appeal, however, the Supreme Court reversed the decision,5 holding that the 
immunity clause did not prevent the investigation of the affected public office holders; although they can neither 
be prosecuted nor arrested while in office.  This decision has since offered the necessary impetus for law 
enforcement agencies to investigate allegations of crime against such officers while they are in office and build a 
file which could, and, indeed, have often been used for prosecution on exit from office.6 
 
 
3.7 Adherence to the Law Making Procedure 
 
The role of the court in judicial review of legislative and executive actions was further emphasised in 
the case of Attorney General, Abia State v Attorney General Federation,7 where the Supreme Court of Nigeria, 
per Tobi JSC, stated that  where the National Assembly or the State House of Assembly, in the exercise of its 
constitutional power to make laws, strays from the constitutional purview of section 4(2) and section 4(7) of the 
Constitution respectively and a question as to constitutionality or constitutionalism arises, the courts in the 
exercise of their judicial powers, when asked by a party, will move in to stop any excess in exercise of 
legislative power.  
 
3.8 Protection of Human Rights  
 
Judicial review of executive actions also extends to the protection of the citizen’s fundamental rights 
from abuse by government agencies and individuals.  The extent of the guarantee or protection of human rights 
in a country is measured not by the width of the relevant constitutional provisions, but the manner or nature in 
which such provisions are interpreted and implemented.8   Citizens look increasingly up to the judiciary to see to 
executive accountability and the protection of their basic rights.9    
 
Elaborate provisions in the Constitution on the rights of the citizens are not in themselves enough to 
guarantee their implementation or enforcement.  It requires judicial enforcement to give effect and life to those 
provisions.  Similarly, a constitutional guarantee of a right may be inadequate, but in expounding the provisions 
through judicial review or enforcement, the courts may inject life into them. 
                                                          
1
  Ibid, Per Akinola Akintan JSC. 
2
   Immunity of Executive Heads of Government from judicial processes was first introduced into the Nigerian constitutional 
jurisprudence under section 267 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979. 
3
     Mamman & Okorie, Op. Cit. 
4
   (2002) 7 NWLR (Pt. 767) 606. per Egbo-Egbo J. 
5
  The Court, however, refrained from ordering mandamus to compel investigation by the police, being a question of 
discretion. 
6
   Mamman and Okorie, Op. Cit. 
7
   (2006) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1005) 265 at 381 – 382; see also the earlier case of Attorney General of Bendel State v Attorney 
General of the Federal (1982) 10 SC 11, where the Supreme Court of Nigeria declared null and void the Revenue 
Allocation Act 1981 for non-compliance with the procedure laid down in the Constitution for the making of law relating 
to money and other revenue matters. 
8
  F.S. Nariman, “Judicial Aspects of Human Rights Protection in India” (1992) (17) (N0. 4) International Legal Practitioner 
118 at 112. 
9
   M. Pieterse, “Coming to Terms With Judicial Enforcement of Social Economic Rights” (2004) 20 SAJHR 383 at 388. 
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The Supreme Court of India has developed three basic commitments to aid the promotion of human 
rights: one is the commitment to participative justice, the other is the commitment against arbitrariness and the 
last one is the commitment to just standards of procedure.1  
 The Nigerian courts have shown great courage in the protection of the fundamental rights of the 
citizens even during military rule when these rights where greatly curtailed and frequently abused.  In Attorney 
General of the Federation v Abule,2 the Court of Appeal emphasised that the Constitution being the organic law 
of the country declares in a formal, emphatic and binding principles the rights, liberties, responsibilities among 
others, of the people including the government.  It is, therefore, the duty of the authorities, which include the 
judiciary, to ensure its observance.  The court in Nigeria therefore play a significant role in safeguarding the 
fundamental rights of persons through effective intervention in cases where it is shown that such rights have 
been or are being threatened.3  Commenting on the role of judges in America in relation to the protection of 
fundamental rights of citizens, Warren CJ, in Trop v Dulles,4 stated as follows: 
 
We are oath-bound to defend the Constitution.  This obligation requires that congressional 
enactments be judged by standards of the Constitution.  The Judiciary has the duty of 
implementing the constitutional safeguard that protects individual rights.  When the 
Government acts to take away the fundamental right of citizenship, the safeguards of the 
Constitution should be examined with special diligence… when it appears that an Act of 
Congress conflicts with one of the provisions of the Constitution, we have no choice but 
to enforce the paramount commands of the Constitution.  We are sworn to do no less.5 
 
 The foregoing words of Warren CJ are equally relevant to the courts in Nigeria to guide them in 
protecting the fundamental rights of citizens as guaranteed in the Constitution and other human rights 
instruments.  It is however important to reiterate that while the exercise of the power of judicial review by 
Nigerian courts has so far been quite encouraging and commendable; the attainment of optimal performance by 
the courts has been impeded by several intractable factors, some of which are examined below: 
 
4 Impediments to Effective Exercise of Judicial Review in Nigeria 
4.1 Problem of judicial independence  
 Although the Constitution of Nigeria and those of most African countries recognise and guarantee the 
independence of the judiciary, this principle remains elusive in practice.  There is apparent lack of commitment 
to the principle of judicial independence by most political leaders in Nigeria and other African states.  
Obviously, the independence of the judiciary is an integral part of a constitutional democracy.6  A cardinal 
feature of a democratic system is the doctrine that the judicial branch is independent, and that judges, as officers 
of the courts, are protected from political influence or other pressures that might affect their judgments.   The 
remuneration packages of judges and the attendant social prestige that accompany their offices are meant to give 
them financial independence and immunity from economic and social temptations.   However, independence of 
the judiciary means more than absence of interference from the other organs of government.  According to 
Aguda,7 it means: 
 
“…the deciding officers shall be independent in full sense, from external direction by any 
political and administrative superiors in the dispensation of individual cases and inwardly 
free from the influences of personal gain and partisan or popular bias; thirdly, that day to 
day decisions shall be reasoned, rationally justified in terms that take full account of both 
of the demands of general principles and the demands of the particular situation”.8  
 
                                                          
1
   P.N. Bhagwati, “Human Rights as evolved by the Jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of India” (1987) 13 Commonwealth 
Law Bulletin 236 at 237. 
2
   (2005) 11 NWLR (Pt. 936) 369. 
3
  Constitution of the FRN, 1999, s. 46, which grants special jurisdiction to the High Court for enforcement of the 
fundamental rights of any person who alleges that any of his fundamental rights has been, is being or likely to be 
contravened in any State. 
4
   (1958) 356 US 86. 
5
   Ibid. at 104. 
6
   J.B. Diescho, “The Paradigm of an Independent Judiciary: Its History, Implications and Limitations in Africa” available at 
http://www.kas.de/upload/aus,landshomepages/narmibia/independence_judiciary/diescho.pdf.  (accessed 12/4/2014). 
7
    A. Aguda, The Judicial Process and the Third Republic (Lagos: F & A Publishers, 1992) pp. 35 - 36. 
8
    Ibid. 
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 Impartiality or neutrality means not merely an absence of personal bias or prejudice in the judge but 
also the exclusion of irrelevant consideration such as his political, social, economic or religious views.  It means 
that the judge should not advert to matters which go beyond those necessary for decision in the case before him.  
The judge is not to take into account any consequences which might flow from his decision and which is wider 
than the direct interests of the parties.  The judge must act like a political, economic, and social eunuch and have 
no interest outside his court when he comes to decide a case.1 
 The Nigerian judiciary has been widely condemned for alleged complicity in the political and social 
malady that has afflicted the country.  It has been accused, for example, by aggrieved politicians of favouring 
their political opponents in the ruling party in the handling of election petition cases.2   
The judiciary itself must take positive steps to improve its image and secure its independence.  The 
National Judicial Council must be active in monitoring the conduct and performance of judicial officers.  Reports 
of misconduct against judicial officers must be promptly investigated and determined.  Erring judicial officers 
should be punished accordingly, to serve as deterrence to others.  The judiciary must project and nurture its good 
reputation in respect of its independence and integrity, by, providing adequate domestic mechanisms to correct 
erroneous or unjust decisions, making access to the courts friendly and comfortable, and demystifying anything 
in the language of the law that makes it unintelligible.3 
 Financial autonomy is also an aspect of judicial independence.  The constitutional provisions on 
financial autonomy of the Nigerian judiciary are apt and unequivocal.  Section 81(3) of the Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 provides that: “the amount standing to the credit of the judiciary in the 
consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation shall be paid directly to the National Judicial Council for 
disbursement”.  Similarly, section 121(3) provides, with respect to the State judiciary, that: “any amount 
standing to the credit of the judiciary in the consolidated revenue fund of the State shall be paid directly to the 
heads of the courts concerned”. 
 However, despite these clear constitutional provisions, the executive branch, both at the Federal and 
State levels have been reluctant to enforce them.  Indeed, many State Governors consider these provisions as 
“affront to their imperial powers and prefer to see the Chief Judges and other heads of courts trembling before 
them, cap in hand to beg for funds to run the State’s judiciaries”.4  In a recent judgment, the Federal High Court, 
per Ademola J., directed that in line with constitutional provisions, funds meant for the judiciary should be 
disbursed directly to the heads of courts and not to the executive arm of government.5  The court further 
restrained the heads of the federal and state executive arm of government from holding on to funds appropriated 
to the judiciary; and declared that “The piecemeal allocation of funds through the State’s Ministry of Finance to 
the State’s judiciary at the Federal Government and State’s pleasure was unconstitutional, unprocedural, 
cumbersome, null, void, and should be stopped forthwith”.   Expectedly, the implementation of this judgment 
has not been free from resistance by the executive arm of government, resulting in series of strike actions by the 
judiciary workers who are insisting on the full implementation of the court’s judgment.      
 
4.2 The Problem of Corruption in the Judiciary 
 
The judiciary in Nigeria has not only remained financially dependent on the executive for many years, 
but has also been excessively politicised.6  This state of affairs makes the judiciary vulnerable to corruption.  
While corruption in the judiciary relates to unprofessional or infamous conduct by some judicial officers, it is 
also taken to mean attempts by extraneous bodies to undermine the judiciary either through inducement, 
cajoling, intimidation, or some other means.7   Undoubtedly, a financially dependent judiciary cannot enjoy full 
autonomy neither can it dispense justice without fear or favour. 
Consequently, while the Nigerian masses might historically perceive the judiciary as “the last hope of 
the common man”, the political elite have sought to humiliate, exploit or marginalise the judiciary through 
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  Lord Reid “The Judge as Law Maker”, available at www.oppapers.com/subjects/thejudge... accessed  12/5/2014.  
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   See I. Nnochiri, “Corruption in Nigerian Judiciary: How Safe is 2011 General Elections?” Vanguard, Nov. 18,  2014. 
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  O.C. Ruppel, “The Role of the Executive in Safeguarding the Independence of the Judiciary in Namibia”, available at 
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4
   E. Essien & Mary Udofia, “Judicial Reforms and Democracy in Nigeria”  E. Essien (ed.) Law: All-Round Excellence 
Essays in Honour of Professor Peter Umana Umoh, Ph. D (London) (Lagos: Toplaw Publishments Ltd, 2012) p. 13.   
5
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Vanguard July 31, 2014.     
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  E.O. Ojo, and P.F. Adebajo, “Can Nigeria’s Nascent Democracy Survive?” (2009) 11 Journal of Sustainable 
Development in Africa 1 17 – 19.  See also I.S. Ogundiya, Democracy and Good Governance: Nigeria’s Dilemma (2010) 
4 Afr. J. Int’l Rela 6, 206. 
7
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Nigeria. (1996). 
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inducements that affect its independence.  The situation is compounded by the deplorable economic condition of 
the country, which makes an individual susceptible to corruption.  Ojebode, contends that in a society bedeviled 
by social insecurity, political instability and economic woes, it would “require near superhuman guts to be 
upright and stand firm on the side of judicial integrity, independence, due process of the law and kindred virtues 
of democratic polity”.1    Corruption in the judiciary does not only lead to delay in justice but may also lead to its 
eventual denial and thereby perpetuating the same injustice which the judiciary is meant to cure. 2   No 
meaningful reform can be successful in this sector unless this menace is properly dealt with.3 
The current efforts of the National Judicial Council in monitoring the performance of judicial officers 
through the requirement of periodic returns on the number of cases handled and entertainment of petitions 
against judicial officers, among others, have impacted positively on the attitude and performance of the Nigerian 
judicial officers.  The tempo must however be sustained. 
 
4.3 Problem of judicial philosophy  
  
A Constitution is not a mere monument for the nation and generations yet unborn.  Therefore, the 
courts should adopt a flexible, progressive, functional and purposive approach rather than strict, legalistic, 
conservative and mechanistic approach to constitutional interpretation.  A contrary approach, will among other 
things, stifle the development of healthy constitutional jurisprudence.4 
In the Nigerian case of Nafiu Rabiu v Kano State,5  Udoma, JSC advocated the liberal/purposive 
approach in the interpretation of statutes and the Constitution, when he stated as follows: 
 
My Lords, it is my view that the approach of this court (Supreme Court) to the 
construction of the Constitution should be and so it has been, one of liberalism, probably a 
variation of the theme of the general maxim ut res magi valeat quam pereat.  I do not 
conceive it to be the duty of this court so to construe any of the provisions of the 
Constitution to defeat the obvious ends the Constitution was designed to serve where 
another construction equally in accord and consistent with the words and sense of such 
provisions will serve to enforce and protect such ends.6 
 
Though, Udoma JSC did not give the lead judgment in the case, his recommended approach for 
interpretation of the Constitution, contained in his concurring judgment, has been adopted in several subsequent 
decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal.7  However, in most other cases, the courts in Nigeria 
still follow the concept of traditionalism and literalism8 in the interpretation of statutes and the Constitution.  
 
4.4 The Problem of Locus Standi 
 
The citizens do not have unfettered access to court for the enforcement of their rights and protection of 
the Constitution.  The problem of locus standi constitutes a major impediment to the full utilization of the court 
to foster constitutionalism in Nigeria.  Therefore, where there is any executive or legislative action which 
violates the provision of the Constitution, an individual citizen may be restricted by the doctrine of locus standi 
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   Ibid. at 151. 
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the ballot paper, even though he was just cleared to contest few days to the election.  See also Buhari v INEC (2008) 36 
NSCQR (Pt. 1) 475 at 599 – 602; C.A. Ogbuabor, “The Supreme Court and Presidential Election Petitions in Nigeria: 
The Impregnable Reign of Literalism.” (2010) 6 Nigerian Bar Journal 123 – 164; O.N. Ogbu, “The Doctrine of 
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Bar Journal 29 – 48. 
Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-3240 (Paper)  ISSN 2224-3259 (Online) 
Vol.40, 2015 
 
202 
from maintaining an action in court to remedy the violation and protect the Constitution.  The term locus standi 
denotes the legal capacity to institute proceedings in a court of law.  In the locus classicus case of Adesanya v 
President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria,1 the Supreme Court held that a person has locus standi if he or she 
can show sufficient interest in the action and that his civil rights and obligations have been or are in danger of 
being infringed.2  This is derived from section 6(6)(b) of the Nigerian Constitution which provides that the 
judicial powers vested in the courts shall extend to all matters between persons, or between government or 
authority and to any person in Nigeria, and to all actions and proceedings relating thereto, for the determination 
of any question as to the civil rights and obligations of that person. 
 However, a major shift in judicial attitude on the requirement of locus standi in public law, manifested 
in the case of Fawehinmi v President F.R.N,3  where the Court of Appeal held that it will definitely be a source 
of concern to any tax payer who watches the funds he contributed or is contributing towards the running of the 
affairs of the State being wasted when such funds could have been channeled into providing jobs, creating 
wealth and providing security to the citizens.4  Such an individual has sufficient interest in coming to court to 
enforce the law and to ensure that his tax money is utilized prudently.5 
 Though the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and held that the Appellant had locus standi to 
maintain the action, it still stressed the need to amend the Constitution on the issue of locus standi and access to 
court, when it further held as follows: 
 
It will be appropriate at this point to proffer that for this country to remain governed under 
the rule of law in view of the controversies the problem of locus standi has generated 
especially in constitutional matters, it is suggested that any future constitutional 
amendment should provide for access to court by any Nigerian in order to preserve, 
protect and defend the Constitution.6 
 
 It is significant to note that the above decision, not being a decision of the Supreme Court of Nigeria, 
has not finally settled the controversy on the issue of locus standi in public law in Nigeria.  Nevertheless, the 
court’s suggestion on the necessity for a constitutional amendment to liberalise the issue of locus standi in 
constitutional matters in Nigeria is quite plausible.7  A good example of such liberalisation could be found in 
Article 2 of the Ghanaian Constitution, which provides as follows:8 
 
1. A person who alleges that: 
(a) an enactment or anything contained in or done under the authority of that or any 
other enactment; 
(b) any act or omission of any person is inconsistent with or in contravention of a 
provision of this Constitution may bring an action in the Supreme Court for a 
declaration to that effect. 
 
2. The Supreme Court shall, for the purposes of declaration under Clause (1) of this 
article, make such orders or give such directions as it may consider appropriate 
for giving effect, or enabling effect to be given, to the declaration so made. 
 
The Supreme Court of Ghana is further empowered to impose sanctions for non-compliance with the 
orders made pursuant to the above provision by clauses 4 and 5 of Article 2 as follows: 
 
(4) Failure to obey or carry out the terms of an order or direction made or given 
under clause (2) of this article constitutes a high crime under this Constitution 
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and shall, in the cases of the President or the Vice-President, constitute a ground 
for removal from office under this Constitution. 
 
(5) A person convicted of high crime under clause (4) of this article shall – 
(a) be liable to imprisonment not exceeding ten years without the option of 
a fine; and 
(b) not be eligible for election, or for appointment, to any public office for 
ten years beginning with the date of the expiration of the term of 
imprisonment. 
 
In the case of Sam (N0. 2) v Attorney General,1 the Supreme Court of Ghana held that any citizen is 
entitled to invoke Article 2 of the Constitution for interpretation or enforcement of the Constitution without the 
requirement of establishing a special personal interest in the outcome of the case.  Thus, every citizen has an 
inherent right to enforce the Constitution.  
 
5. Conclusion  
The impressive courage so far exhibited by the Nigerian courts in the exercise of its power of judicial 
review portends well for the promotion of constitutionalism in Nigeria.    Indeed, since the inception of the 
current democratic experience in Nigeria in 1999, there have been a number of occasions when the intervention 
of the courts, especially the Supreme Court was sought in various constitutional and electoral matters.  In all 
these cases, the apex court had never shied away from playing its constitutionally assigned role in the polity.  
The essence of the Court’s intervention has always been to promote democratic culture among the Nigerian 
populace, strengthen the confidence of the people in the democratic process and promote constitutionalism and 
due process in the political system.2 
 Generally, judicial review is a potent instrument for checking and restraining the exercise of executive 
and legislative powers.  Indeed, the mere consciousness by the executive and the legislature that their actions and 
decisions could be reviewed by the judiciary and struck down as unconstitutional, could constitute a major 
mechanism for restraining the exercise of executive and legislative powers.   However, the independence of the 
judiciary is central to the effective performance of judicial review and other judicial functions.   It is submitted 
that apart from Liberia where the judiciary is virtually subservient to the executive, the judiciary in Ghana, 
Nigeria and South Africa have secured varying degrees of independence.  Though financial autonomy and 
independence have not yet been fully achieved, funding of the judiciary in Nigeria has improved tremendously 
within the last three years and this has reflected in the provision/upgrading of physical structures and facilities of 
the judiciary. 
The salaries and welfare packages of judicial officers have also received a great boost.  Osibanjo, 
former Attorney General of Lagos State3, sums up the improvements in the conditions of service of judicial 
officers as follows:   
   
In 1999 judges of the High Court earned barely N70,000 monthly.  They were entitled to an 
official car and a driver which was withdrawn on retirement….Today, approved monthly 
remuneration for judges is in excess of N500,000 a month.  Upon retirement, every judge is 
given a house for life; in addition, a piece of land in a choice location.  Recently, a generous 
holiday allowance was approved which would enable the judges and a spouse to spend a 
comfortable vacation abroad.4 
 
However, incidents of corruption have not disappeared from the judiciary5 and the judicial philosophy 
of supporting the executive has not completely shifted in favour of the modern conceptions of constitutionalism.  
Therefore, even if full independence is secured, the effectiveness of the Nigerian judiciary to check the executive 
and legislative branches of government would still be hampered by its jurisprudence of executive supremacy, 
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which is fundamentally different from the jurisprudence of constitutionalism.1  In general, judges who follow the 
former, disclaim any exercise of discretion on their part in matters of interpretation.  In practice, too, they tend to 
follow strictly the dictates of past precedents and usually give literal effect to the plain meaning of legal texts.  
As a result, their methods of interpretation tend to be narrow, rule-driven, and text-bound.2  A jurisprudence of 
constitutionalism, on the other hand, invites more active judicial intermediation and interpretation.  In particular, 
it demands that judges interpreting a constitutional text not only consult the spirit of the law but also endeavor to 
harmonise the letter with the spirit.  To do so, judges must bring to their reasoning and decisions a clear 
understanding of the overarching values and philosophical foundations of a liberal democracy; of the social, 
economic, and political evolution of their country; and of the historical antecedents and contemporary purposes 
of the particular provision in dispute.3  
 
6. Recommendations 
 
Based on our discussions in this article, the following recommendations are proffered for the effective 
utilisation of the power of judicial review by the Nigerian courts to promote constitutionalism in the country: 
 
6.1 Transparency in Recruitment of Judicial Officers   
The process of recruiting judicial officers should be more transparent in order to ensure that only 
qualified, competent and honest persons of integrity are appointed into the Nigerian bench.   
  
6.2 Continuing Education and Training of Judicial Officers 
In view of the need for jurisprudential change, the judiciary must give priority to continuing legal 
education for judges.  Emphasis should be placed on comparative study of contemporary constitutional law, 
administrative law, human rights law, and public law jurisprudence in general.4  Judges’ appreciation of the 
jurisprudence of constitutionalism could also be enhanced by learning gained from cognate disciplines, like 
political theory, legal history, and ethics.5   
 
 
6.3 Periodic Review and Improvement of the Conditions of Service of Judicial Officers 
 
There is need to periodically review and improve the conditions of service of judicial officers in line 
with prevailing economic realities in the country. 
 
6.4 Independence and Financial Autonomy of the Judiciary 
The judiciary in Nigeria, and, other African countries, has not attained full independence from 
executive influence.  All constitutional and statutory provisions on the independence and financial autonomy of 
the judiciary should be fully enforced.  The independence of the judiciary is a vital guarantee of a democratic 
society, and, is built on the foundation of public confidence.   
 
6.5 Liberalisation of Locus Standi Requirement 
The requirement of locus standi should be liberalised in Nigeria.  The current position where a plaintiff 
must show his personal interest in the subject matter, and, what he stands to lose, has constituted an impediment 
to the development of public interest litigations and judicial review of executive and legislative actions in 
Nigeria.  In this regard, it is recommended that Nigeria should borrow from the Constitution of Ghana which 
grants the citizens the right to bring an action in the Supreme Court for the enforcement of the supremacy of the 
Constitution.6  Under the Constitution of South Africa, every citizen has the right to protect the Constitution 
from infringement. 7   This is an effective way of checking and restraining the exercise of executive and 
legislative powers, for the enhancement of constitutionalism in the country. 
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6.6 Public Enlightenment and Education on Tenets of Constitutionalism 
 
It is also recommended that efforts be made to enlist and strengthen commitment of political leaders 
and the ordinary citizens to constitutionalism in Nigeria.  This role can best be performed by those engaged in 
advocacy such as non-governmental organisations.  The Nigerian Bar Association can mobilise and sensitise its 
members to advocate and promote the practice of constitutionalism.  The media, the churches and other religions 
organisations can also play an important role in this regard.   
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